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Abstract 
 
Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with 
income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the 
long run when individuals are far- sighted, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents 
would react to their choice of insurance partners. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the 
agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and efficiency that arises when individuals are 
myopic. We find that for extreme values of the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement, myopic 
and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate costs, farsighted agents form 
efficient networks while myopic agents don't. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the formation of risk-sharing networks. There are regions
in developing countries where the access to a formal insurance market is limited.
Some villages lack for instance institutions that can enforce contracts or repayments
of loans. Economic uctuations, due to climate shocks, crop pests, illness or fu-
neral expenditures are important in those low income areas. Informal risk-sharing
appears to be one of the prominent strategy used to cope with these shocks (see the
survey of Alderman and Paxson, 1994). That is, households in need receive help
from others, in the form of free loans or transfers. A growing empirical literature
(see Fafchamps, 1992; Grimmard, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt
and Dercon, 2006) has shown that a fully e¢ cient risk-pooling equilibrium is not
reached: risk-sharing does not take place within exogenous group such as the vil-
lage, but rather within networks involving agents having common characteristics
(neighborhood, professional or religious a¢ liation, kinship, etc).
Most of the theoretical papers on informal risk-sharing in developing countries
assume that no binding agreement can be enforced. In this context, if the risk occurs
only once, the fortunate agent has no incentive to transfer money ex-post. However,
this e¤ect disappears in a dynamic setting where multiple shocks are expected to
occur since agents who transfer money today may expect to be reciprocated at a
future date. This literature o¤ers a theoretical argument to explain the observed lack
of complete income pooling at the village level by analyzing the transfer schemes
which are such that each agent is willing to conform to the agreement once the
uncertain income shock occurs.1
1Kimball (1988) has shown that if individuals are su¢ ciently patient, then some rst-best
allocation, i.e. allocations that would be e¢ cient if agents had the possibility to commit to a
transfer scheme, can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Coate and Revallion
(1993) have studied the symmetric two-player model by restricting their analysis to stationary
transfers. They have improved upon Kimball (1988) in that they have endogenized the amount of
transfers while previous work had considered only the extreme cases of complete income pooling
or no transfer at all. Kocherlakota (1996) has further analysed the case of impatient agents and
has shown that the Pareto-undominated subgame perfect allocations imply a positive correlation
between individual consumption and current and lagged income. Ligon, Thomas and Worrall
(2002) have shown that allowing transfers to depend upon history of transfers is payo¤ improving
for the agents. Genicot and Ray (2003) have further studied this problem by adding the possibility
that groups of agents jointly deviate from the prescribed transfer scheme. Finally, Bloch, Genicot
and Ray (2005) have adapted previous work for situations where transfers occur through a network
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Platteau (2002) has argued that risk-sharing usually occurs among relatives and
even if the institutional context does not provide the tools to enforce contracts,
agents involved in a risk-sharing relationship may be committed to the agreement
because the social norm imposes it. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) have developed
a model, where agents establish their informal insurance relationships endogenously,
assuming that linked pairs can commit to share equally their income. They have
considered agents who are ex ante homogeneous, but di¤er through their position
in the network.2 They have shown that the e¢ cient risk-sharing networks are such
that each agent is indirectly connected to the others, involving the maximal level
of insurance in the population, and that networks formed by myopic agents connect
fewer individuals than the e¢ cient ones. They have thus provided another theoret-
ical explanation of the observation that informal insurance does not occur at the
village level.
Empirical studies support the idea that mutual risk-sharing agreements are
formed endogenously. For instance, Rosenweig and Stark (1989) have observed
that marriages between households from di¤erent regions in India occur to diver-
sify geographically the risks.3 Dekker (2004) has studied the endogenous formation
of risk-sharing networks in four resettlement villages in rural Zimbabwe. She has
found that in a social environment where blood relatives are scarce, resettled house-
holds have strongly invested in activities to establish links with surrogate relatives.
Comola (2008) has observed that the structure of the network, that is the social po-
sition of an agent with respect to the others, is critical to understand the choice of
risk-sharing partners. Based on data on the village Nyakatoke in Tanzania, she has
rather than through a group.
2There have been other attempts to model the formation of informal network in the spirit of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), where direct links involve benets and costs, while indirect links
a¤ect positively or negatively the agents depending on the nature of the network externalities.
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007b) have studied the formation of risk-sharing networks among agents
living in two di¤erent villages, assuming that the shock to the income of households is village spe-
cic. Comola (2008) has proposed a model of network formation, where benets and costs to links
formation are heterogeneous. Krishnan and Sciubba (2008) have extended the co-author model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to study bilateral labor exchange agreements among heterogeneous
agents.
3Grimmard (1997) has found evidence of transfers and migrations in Côte dIvoire supporting
this idea.
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found that "not only the characteristics of direct friends, but also the characteristics
of indirect contacts are taken into account when a link is created".
This paper analyzes which pattern of insurance relationships emerges in the long
run when agents are farsighted, rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able
to forecast how other agents would react to their choice of partners. In his survey
of models of network formation, Jackson (2005) has mentioned that farsightedness
is an important consideration in some appropriate context. He has stated that "in
large networks it might be that players have very little ability to forecast how the
network might change in reaction to the addition or deletion of a link. In such
situations the myopic solutions are quite reasonable. However, if players have very
good information about how others might react to changes in the network, then
these are things that one wants to allow for either in the specication of the game
or in the denition of the stability concept". To our knowledge, no existing work
has attempted to establish whether agents are farsighted or not when creating their
network in rural areas of developing countries. However, we believe that the key
ingredients mentioned by Jackson (2005) for farsightedness to matter are present in
this framework: our focus is on small communities, where agents have good informa-
tion about each other. Agents in the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) are
strategic: they establish links with other agents, anticipating that these connections
might be protable in the future if they face negative income shocks. In this paper,
we assume that agents are a bit more strategic: in addition to forming connections
in anticipation of likely future negative shocks, they also realize that their choice of
partners may determine otherschoices of partners. Such anticipation is consistent
with Comola (2008)s observation that the full architecture of bilateral agreements
determines the incentives for a pair of agents to establish a partnership. We adopt
the notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set due to Herings, Mauleon and Vannetel-
bosch (2009) to determine which networks are formed by farsighted agents.4 We nd
that for small costs of establishing and maintaining a partnership, farsighted agents
may form e¢ cient networks that involve full income pooling while myopic agents
form networks connecting fewer individuals. Two mechanisms explain this result: (i)
Farsighted agents belonging to small groups may decide to create new partnerships
4Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Xue
(1998), Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Page,
Wooders and Kamat (2005), Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005), and Page and Wooders (2009).
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that are not directly protable to them, because they realize that other partners
will further join this bigger and more attractive group. In other words, the farsight-
edness of the agents may solve a coordination problem. (ii) Farsighted agents may
refrain from deleting costly links if they belong to a big group, as they understand
that this may induce others to rearrange their partnerships in a way that deters the
myopic incentives to delete the link at rst. We have already mentioned that em-
pirical studies have revealed that risk-sharing occurs among agents having common
characteristics. Farsightedness may be a factor rationalizing this observation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations
and denitions for networks, and we present the model of risk-sharing networks of
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a). In Section 3, we investigate the formation of risk-
sharing networks when agents are myopic. Section 4 provides a characterization of
the pairwise farsightedly stable set of risk-sharing networks. In Section 5, we analyze
more in detail the formation of risk-sharing networks when agents have a quadratic
utility function. In Section 6, we conclude.
2 Model and notation
Networks
A network (N; g) is dened by a set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng and a list g of which
pairs of individuals among the agent set N are linked to each other. For sake of
notation we simply use the set of links g to refer to the network when the player setN
is xed. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modelled
as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the network and links indicate
bilateral relationships between individuals. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and
j are linked under the network g. Let gN be the collection of all subsets of N with
cardinality 2, so gN is the complete network. The set of all possible networks on N is
denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN . The network obtained by adding the
link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from
deleting the link ij from an existing network g is denoted g  ij. For any network g,
let N(g) = fi 2 N j 9 j such that ij 2 gg be the set of agents who have at least one
link in the network g. The degree of agent i in a network g is the number of links
that involve that agent: di(g) = #fj 2 N j ij 2 gg. The total number of links of a
network g is given by d(g) = i2Ndi(g)=2. A path in a network g 2 G between i and
4
j is a sequence of agents i1; : : : ; iK such that ikik+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g
with i1 = i and iK = j. A network g is connected if for each pair of agents i and
j such that i 6= j there exists a path in g between i and j. A component of a
network (N; g), is a nonempty subnetwork (N 0; g0) such that ; 6= N 0  N , g0  g
satisfying (i) (N 0; g0) is connected, and (ii) if i 2 N 0 and ij 2 g, then j 2 N 0 and
ij 2 g0.5 The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). A component of a network is
minimally connected if the path between any two agents in that component is unique.
The set of networks composed of minimally connected components is denoted Gm.
Formally, Gm = fg 2 G j #C(g) < #C(g   ij) for each ij 2 gg [ fg;g, where g; is
the empty network. A network is minimally connected if all the agents are in the
same minimally connected component. The set of minimally connected networks is
GM = fg 2 Gm j #C(g) = 1g. We use the measure of betweenness centrality of
Freeman (1977). Letting Pi(kj) denote the number of shortest paths between k and
j that i lies on, and P (kj) = i=2fk;jgPi(kj), the betweenness centrality of an agent
i is given by CeBi (g) = (2=((n   1)(n   2)))k 6=j:i=2fk;jgPi(kj)=P (kj). This measure
will be used to determine the central agents of a connected line. A connected line
is a minimally connected network (N; g) such that no agent in N has more than
two links. The set of connected lines is GL = fg 2 GM j di(g)  2 for all i 2 Ng.
The central elements of a line g 2 GL are the agents with the highest measure of
betweenness centrality. Formally, for g 2 GL, Ce(g) = fi 2 N j CeBi (g)  CeBj (g)
for all j 2 Ng.
Model
We further investigate the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) where n
ex-ante identical individuals are risk averse and face shocks to their income. Each
individuals income, yi, is a random variable which is independently and identically
distributed with mean y and variance 2. Agents have identical preferences, repre-
sented by the utility function v, which is increasing and strictly concave in monetary
holdings. Individuals may create links with each other. By doing so, they commit to
pool their income with the other agents in their component and to share it equally.6
5This denition of components is proposed by Jackson (2008) and implies that an agent without
links in a network is considered as a component.
6In reality, full income pooling is not observed. Ligon (1998) nds that information asymmetry is
the main factor explaining incomplete income pooling in rural India. Lack of commitment (Coates
and Revallion, 1993) is another explanation of this observation. In our model, we assume full
information and that agents have the ability to commit to a future contingent transfer. As such,
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It follows that risk-sharing benets only depend on the number of individuals in
the component. If agents 1; 2; :::; s belong to a component of size s, then the mon-
etary holdings of each agent in this component are (y1 + y2 + ::: + ys)=s and their
expected utility are given by u(s) = Ev((y1 + y2 + :::+ ys)=s), where E denotes the
expectation over the realization of incomes. The expected monetary holdings of an
agent are independent of the network, but the variance of her expected monetary
holdings is decreasing with the size of the component to which she belongs. Since
agents are risk-averse, the expected utility function u(s) is increasing in the size of
the component, that is u(s + 1) > u(s) for all integer s. In addition, we assume
that it increases at a decreasing rate, i.e. u(s + 2)   u(s + 1) < u(s + 1)   u(s)
for all s. That is, the bigger is the set of agents with whom an agent shares her
risk, the smaller is her benet to have a new insurance partner. Each direct link ij
results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost should be interpreted as an amount
of resources needed to ensure that the transfers are realized ex-post, once the shock
is realized. In other words, it is assumed that a richer agent will share her revenue
with a poorer agent to whom she is linked, because those agents have developed a
relationship of trust among themselves, which was costly to establish. We assume
that these costs are non-monetary and as such, they cannot be shared with other
members of the component. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) have motivated this
assumption by saying that "some costs, such as the time incurred to build a relation
are not easy to compensate or transfer". The payo¤ of agent i in the network g is
given by
Ui(g) = u(si)  di(g)c;
where di(g) indicates the number of links agent i has and si denotes the size of the
component to which she belongs, si = #S, where i 2 S and (S; h) 2 C(g).
E¢ ciency
A network g 2 G is e¢ cient if it maximizes the total societal value, that is
if i2NUi(g)  i2NUi(g0) for all g0 2 G. E¢ cient networks are composed of
minimally connected components since otherwise, productive resources would be
wasted. The total utility of the agents in a network g composed of k minimally
connected components is given by i2NUi(g) = kj=1sju(sj)   2c(n   k), where sj
the choice of the equal sharing rule seems appropriate as it is the optimal one.
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is the size of the component j. The assumption on the expected utility function
ensures that the total value of a component is increasing with the size of this com-
ponent, namely (s + 1)u(s + 1) > su(s). Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) have
shown that this total value could increase at an increasing or decreasing rate, i:e:
(s + 2)u(s + 2)   (s + 1)u(s + 1) could be bigger or smaller than (s + 1)u(s + 1) 
su(s).7 We assume in this paper that the total value of a component is increasing
with the size of this component at a nondecreasing rate. E¢ cient networks can then
only be of two types: either nobody is linked or everybody is indirectly connected.
Let us note by c = (n[u(n)   u(1)])=(2(n   1)) the critical cost of link formation
such that the empty network generates the same total utility than a minimally con-
nected network. When (s + 2)u(s + 2)  (s + 1)u(s + 1) > (s + 1)u(s + 1)  su(s)
for all s 2 f1; 2; :::; n  2g, the empty network is e¢ cient if c > c, while an e¢ cient
network is composed of one component connecting minimally the n agents if c < c.
3 Stable risk-sharing networks when agents are
myopic
In this section, we investigate the formation of stable risk-sharing networks when
agents are myopic. We adopt the notion of pairwise myopically stable sets due to
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which is a generalization of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) pairwise stability notion. A pairwise myopically stable set is such
that from any network outside this set, there is a myopic improving path leading
to some network in the set, and each deviation outside the set is deterred because
the deviating agents do not prefer the resulting network. The notion of myopic
improving path is due to Jackson and Watts (2002) and is dened as a sequence of
networks that might be observed when agents are adding or deleting links, one at a
time, in order to improve their current payo¤. Formally, a myopic improving path
from a network g to a network g0 6= g is a nite sequence of networks g1; : : : ; gK with
g1 = g and gK = g0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g either: (i) gk+1 = gk   ij
7No general properties of v and y determine the curvature of su(s). Bramoullé and Kranton
(2007a) have shown that when the primitive utility function is CARA: v(y) = v0   e y, where
 > 0 denotes the level of absolute risk-aversion, and if income is normally distributed, then
su(s) is increasing with s at a decreasing rate, while if we consider the quadratic utility function:
v(y) = y   y2, where  is a positive parameter, then su(s) is increasing linearly with s.
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for some ij such that Ui(gk+1) > Ui(gk) or Uj(gk+1) > Uj(gk), or (ii) gk+1 = gk + ij
for some ij such that Ui(gk+1) > Ui(gk) and Uj(gk+1)  Uj(gk). For a given network
g, we denote by M(g) the set of networks that can be reached through a myopic
improving path from g.
Denition 1. A set of networks G  G is pairwise myopically stable if
(i) 8 g 2 G,
(ia) 8 ij =2 g such that g+ ij =2 G, (Ui(g+ ij); Uj(g+ ij)) = (Ui(g); Uj(g)) or Ui(g+
ij) < Ui(g) or Uj(g + ij) < Uj(g),
(ib) 8 ij 2 g such that g   ij =2 G, Ui(g   ij)  Ui(g) and Uj(g   ij)  Uj(g),
(ii) 8g0 2 G nG; M(g0) \G 6= ;;
(iii) @ G0  G such that G0 satises Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii)..
Conditions (ia) and (ib) in Denition 1 capture deterrence of external deviations.
In Condition (ia) the addition of a link ij to a network g 2 G that leads to a network
outside G is deterred because the two agents involved do not prefer the resulting
network to network g. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the case
where a link is severed. Condition (ii) requires external stability. External stability
asks for the existence of a myopic improving path from any network outsideG leading
to some network in G. Notice that the set G (trivially) satises Conditions (ia), (ib),
and (ii) in Denition 1. This motivates Condition (iii), the minimality condition.
Jackson and Watts (2002) have dened the notion of a closed cycle. A closed cycle
is a set of networks C such that for any pair of networks g; g0 2 C, where g 6= g0,
there exists a myopic improving path from g to g0, and each myopic improving
path emanating from a network in the set C does not reach a network outside C.
Each pairwise stable network is a closed cycle. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2009) have proved that the pairwise myopically stable set coincides with the set of
networks that belong to a closed cycle.
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) have shown that the set of closed cycles consists
only of pairwise stable risk-sharing networks if some exist. In addition, they have
analyzed the architecture of pairwise stable networks and the conditions on the
parameters that guarantee their existence. To summarize their results, let s be the
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critical size of a component such that the benet of adding another member to the
component is less than the cost of doing so:
s = max fs 2 N j u(s)  u(s  1)  cg :
Since the expected utility function u is increasing at a decreasing rate, an agent
belonging to a component of size s < s is willing to add a link with a singleton
while an agent belonging to a component of size s > s has incentives to cut a link if
she reaches a component of size s 1. Another threshold s denes the maximal size
of a component of a pairwise stable network if another component in the network
has size s. The threshold s is dened as follows:
s = max fs  s j u(s + s)  u(s)  c, with the inequality being strict if s < sg :
An agent in a component of size s is not willing to add a link with an agent in
a component of size smaller than or equal to s. Each component of a pairwise
stable network is minimally connected and at least one of these components has
size s = minfs; ng. If s = s, pairwise stable networks always exist. They are
composed of a maximal number of components of size s and of one component of
smaller size. If s > s, pairwise stable networks exist if and only if s + s  n.
They are then composed of one component size s and of another of size n  s. Let
G be the set of networks composed of minimally connected components of size s
and of one minimally connected component of size s = n   s int(n=s) if s 6= 0.8
Formally, G = fg 2 Gm j if (S; h) 2 C(g) and #S 6= s, then (i) #S < s and (ii)
for all (S 0; h0) 2 C(g) with S 0 6= S, we have #S 0 = sg. Bramoullé and Kranton
(2007a) have shown that the pairwise myopically stable set G is a superset of G.
Furthermore, the two sets G and G coincide if and only if s+ s  n, or s = s.
Proposition 1. (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) The pairwise myopically
stable set G is such that G  G. In addition, G is the unique pairwise myopically
stable set if and only if either s = s, or n  s + s.
All proofs are presented in the appendix. Let us introduce another threshold, s,
which is the maximal integer such that two agents in di¤erent components of size
s=2 are willing to add a link between them. Formally, it is dened as follows:
s = max fs 2 N j (i) s is even and (ii) u(s)  u(s=2) > cg :
8The operator int(x) gives the integer part of the real x.
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Notice that the addition of a link is not protable for at least one of the agents
involved if one of them belongs to a component of size bigger than s=2.9 The
following proposition states that each network in the pairwise myopically stable set
is composed of minimally connected components of size smaller than or equal to s,
and contains at least s   1 links, but no more than n  1  int((n  1)=s) links.
Proposition 2. Each network g in the pairwise myopically stable set G is such that
(i) g 2 Gm, (ii)#S  s for all (S; h) 2 g and (iii) s 1  d(g)  n 1 int((n 1)=s).
Intuitively, there exists a myopic improving path from every network composed
of components which are not minimally connected to some network composed of
minimally connected components if the agents delete unnecessary links. However,
the converse does not hold. Once a network composed of minimally connected
components is reached, every myopic improving path leads to other networks in
Gm since the addition of a useless link is costly. In addition, from networks composed
of big-sized components, agents are willing to cut links with peripheral agents (agents
having only one link) as long as the size of their component is bigger than s. On
the other hand, from networks composed of small-sized components, no myopic
improving path is leading to a network having a component of size bigger than s
since, if it was the case, an agent should add a link at some point in the path when
she is currently a member of a component of size s > s=2, but the addition of that
link is not protable. Each network of the pairwise myopically stable set has more
than s  1 links since no agent is willing to cut a link if there are s agents or fewer
in her component. Finally, each network in G has less than n   1   int((n   1)=s)
links as this number of links is obtained when the agents form a maximal number
of components of size s.
4 Stable risk-sharing networks when agents are
farsighted
Myopic agents are assessing the protability of their decision to create new mutual
insurance agreements or to remove old ones by considering that their choice has no
impact on othersdecisions. In this section, we analyze the formation risk-sharing
9This result is established in the appendix (see Lemma 3.A.2).
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networks when agents are farsighted, rather than myopic, in the sense that they are
able to anticipate how other agents would react to their choice of partners.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed a solution concept to
address the question of stability when agents are farsighted: the pairwise farsightedly
stable set. Before dening the concept, let us introduce the notion of a farsighted
improving path, which is the counterpart of the myopic improving path described in
the previous section. A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can
emerge when agents form or sever links based on the improvement the end network
o¤ers relative to the current network. Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one
link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two agents involved must
both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the two
strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least
one of the two agents involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. Formally,
it is dened as follows. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network
g0 6= g is a nite sequence of networks g1; : : : ; gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such
that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g either: (i) gk+1 = gk   ij for some ij such that
Ui(gK) > Ui(gk) or Uj(gK) > Uj(gk), or (ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that
Ui(gK) > Ui(gk) and Uj(gK)  Uj(gk). For a given network g, let F (g) = fg0 2 G j
there is a farsighted improving path from g to g0g.
We now introduce the concept of pairwise farsightedly stable set. It is a set of
networks such that (i) the deletion or addition of any link from a network in the set
leading to a network outside the set is deterred by a credible threat of ending worse
o¤, once other agents further react to the initial deviation, (ii) from any network
outside the set, there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network in the
set, and (iii) no proper subset of this set satises the two rst conditions. Formally,
pairwise farsightedly stable sets are dened as follows.
Denition.2. A set of networks G  G is pairwise farsightedly stable with respect
v and Y if
(i) 8 g 2 G,
(ia) 8 ij =2 g such that g + ij =2 G, 9 g0 2 F (g + ij) \ G such that (Yi(g0; v); Yj(g0,
v)) = (Yi(g; v); Yj(g; v)) or Yi(g0; v) < Yi(g; v) or Yj(g0; v) < Yj(g; v),
(ib) 8 ij 2 g such that g   ij =2 G, 9 g0; g00 2 F (g   ij) \ G such that Yi(g0; v) 
Yi(g; v) and Yj(g00; v)  Yj(g; v),
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(ii) 8g0 2 G nG; F (g0) \G 6= ?:
(iii) @ G0  G such that G0 satises Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Condition (i) in Denition 2 requires the deterrence of external deviations. Con-
dition (ia) captures that adding a link ij to a network g 2 G that leads to a network
outside of G; is deterred by the threat of ending in g0: Here g0 is such that there
is a farsighted improving path from g + ij to g0: Moreover, g0 belongs to G; which
makes g0 a credible threat. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for
the case where a link is severed. Condition (ii) in Denition 2 requires external
stability and implies that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations.
From any network outside of G there is a farsighted improving path leading to some
network in G. Notice that the set G (trivially) satises Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii)
in Denition 2. This motivates the requirement of a minimality condition, namely
Condition (iii).
We now provide a partial characterization of the pairwise farsightedly stable sets
of risk-sharing networks. We analyze the case of very small costs of link formation,
the case of small costs of link formation and the case of high costs of link formation.
Very small costs of link formation
Proposition 3 characterizes partially the pairwise farsightedly stable sets when
the costs of link formation satisfy c < u(n)  u(n  1). For such costs, we nd that
(a) each pairwise farsightedly stable set contains at least one connected network,
(b) each set G composed of a minimally connected network eg 2 GM and all other
networks g 2 GM such that Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 N is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set, and (c) each set G composed of a minimally connected network g1 2 GM
and another minimally connected network g2 2 GM such that Ui(g1) 6= Ui(g2) for
some agent i 2 N and g1 and g2 are not star networks (i.e. they are not such that
one agent connects directly all the others) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proposition 3. If 0 < c  u(n)  u(n  1), then
(a) If G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, then #C(g) = 1 for some g 2 G.
(b) For each eg 2 GM , the set G(eg) = fg 2 GM j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 Ng is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
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(c) The set G = fg1; g2g  GM such that Ui(g1) 6= Ui(g2) for some agent i 2 N and
both g1 and g2 are not star networks is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
A connected line Pareto dominates each network composed of multiple com-
ponents for such costs. There are thus no farsighted improving paths from a con-
nected line to a network composed of multiple components. It then follows that
a set of networks that does not include at least one network that connects in-
directly all the agents is not externally stable. To prove part (b) and (c), we
rst show that there is a farsighted improving path from any network outside
G(eg) = fg 2 GM j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 N , for some eg 2 GMg leading to
each network in G(eg). Intuitively, this holds since from any network g outside G(eg),
there always exists an agent willing to cut a link from g or a pair of agents willing
to add a link from g, looking forward to the formation of a network in G(eg). Thus,
the sets proposed in part (b) and (c) of the proposition are such that there are
farsighted improving paths from each network outside the set to some network in
the set. Notice in addition that each pairwise deviation from a network in one of
those sets is deterred by the threat of coming back at the same network in one step.
A star network as a singleton is a pairwise farsightedly stable set according to
part (b) of Proposition 3. It is thus required that g1 and g2 are not star networks in
part (c) of Proposition 3 as otherwise, the set of networks g1 and g2 would fail to be
minimal. In the last section of the paper, we analyze the quadratic utility function
case and we show that when there are four agents, some pairwise farsightedly stable
sets of networks are exclusively composed of networks connecting all the population
but not at the minimal cost. Whether this result holds for general utility function
and for any number of agents remains an open question.
Small costs of link formation
In the next proposition, we show that each set composed of connected line eg
and of all other lines where the payo¤ of the agents is equal to their payo¤ in eg
constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set if the cost of link formation satises
c < min fu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)); (u(n)  u(1))=2g.
Proposition 4. If c < minfu(n)   u(int((n + 1)=2)), (u(n)   u(1))=2g, we have
that
(a) For each eg 2 GL, the set G(eg) = fg 2 GL j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 Ng is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
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(b) The set fg1; g2g where g1; g2 2 GL and Ui(g1) 6= Ui(g2) for some i 2 N is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
In the proof of this proposition, it is rst established that there is a farsighted
improving path from any network outside G(eg) = fg 2 GL j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for
all i 2 N , for some eg 2 GLg leading to each network in G(eg). From a network
outside G(eg), farsighted agents who have more links than in the connected line eg
or who have the same number of links but are indirectly connected to less than
n agents, cut their links until the empty network is reached, looking forward to
the formation of the network eg. From the empty network, the agents add links
in order to build eg such that the last link to be added is the central link of the
line. This last move is protable for the two agents involved in that link since
c < u(n)   u(int((n + 1)=2)). The addition of each other link from the empty
network to eg is protable for farsighted agents having already one link as this allows
them to move from a component of size smaller than int((n+1)=2) to the connected
network eg, and it is protable for isolated agents since u(n)  2c > u(1). Notice in
addition that each pairwise deviation from a network in the set is deterred by the
threat of coming back at the same network.
The pairwise farsightedly stable sets described in Proposition 4 are not neces-
sarily unique. We will see in Section 5 that ine¢ cient networks may also belong to
some pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
High costs of link formation
In Proposition 5, we show that when the cost of link formation is su¢ ciently
high, (a) the set of all networks in which each agent belongs to a component of size
2 is the only pairwise farsightedly stable set if the number of agent is even, (b) the
set of all networks in which the same agent is not connected while the remaining
agents belong to a component of size 2 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if the
number of agent is odd, and (c) the set composed of one network where a maximal
number of linked pairs forms among all the agents but agent k and of one network
where a maximal number of linked pairs forms among all the agents but agent l 6= k
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if the number of agent is odd.
Proposition 5. If u(n)  u(2) < c < u(2)  u(1), then
(a) The set G = fg 2 G j di(g) = 1 for all i 2 Ng is the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set if n is even.
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(b) For k 2 N , the set Gk = fg 2 G j di(g) = 1 for all i 2 N n fkg, and dk(g) = 0g
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if (u(3)  u(1))=2 < c and n is odd,
(c) For k; l 2 N with k 6= l, the set G = fgk; glg, where for m 2 fk; lg, Gm = fg 2
G j di(g) = 1 for all i 2 N n fmg, and dm(g) = 0g is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set if (u(3)  u(1))=2 < c, n is odd and n  5.
When the costs of link formation satisfy u(n) u(2) < c < u(2) u(1), each agent
prefers to be in a network in which she is a member of a component of size two rather
than in any network in which her number of links is di¤erent than one. From any
network that does not belong to the set of networks composed of a maximal number
of linked pairs, agents having more than one link are willing to cut a link, and agents
having no links are willing to add a link, looking forward to a network composed of
a maximal number of linked pairs. Part (a) of the proposition is then derived from
the fact that there are no farsighted improving paths emanating from a network
composed of a maximal number of linked pairs if n is even. When the number of
agents is odd, an agent, say k, is not connected in a network composed of a maximal
number of linked pairs g 2 Gk. Then, part (b) and part (c) of the proposition follow
from the fact that from each network outside Gk, there is a farsighted improving
path to each network in Gk. Also, each deviation from Gk is deterred by the threat
of coming back at the same network in one step.
The characterization of pairwise farsightedly stable sets when the cost of link
formation is intermediate, i.e. when minf(u(n)   u(1))=2; u(n)   u(n=2)g  c 
u(n)   u(2) for n even, or when minf(u(n)   u(1))=2; u(n)   u((n + 1)=2)g  c 
maxf(u(3)  u(1))=2; u(n)  u(2)g for n odd, remains an open question.
Let us summarize the results obtained concerning the structure of risk-sharing
networks formed by farsighted agents and compare them with the networks formed
by myopic agents and the e¢ cient ones. For very small costs of link formation
(c  u(n) u(n 1)) or high ones (u(n) u(2) < c when the population size is even,
or maxfu(n)   u(2); (u(3)   u(1))=2g < c if the population size is odd), farsighted
and myopic agents form the same networks. For very small costs of link formation,
the pairwise myopically stable set is the set of e¢ cient networks (each e¢ cient
network is pairwise stable since s  n for such costs), and each e¢ cient network
belongs to some pairwise farsightedly stable set. For high costs of link formation,
the pairwise myopically stable set contains all networks composed of a maximal
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number of linked pairs (s = 2 = s when u(n)  u(2) < c < u(2)  u(1), implying
that each network in the pairwise myopically stable set is pairwise stable). The
union of the pairwise farsightedly stable sets coincides with the pairwise myopically
stable set when n is even, and contains the pairwise myopically stable set when
n is odd. Whether a network not contained in the pairwise myopically stable set
belongs to some pairwise farsightedly stable set when n is odd remains an open
question. The networks formed di¤er however for small costs of link formation.
When u(n)  u(n  1) < c < minfu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)), (u(n)  u(1))=2g, each
line connecting all the agents and other lines in which the degree of the agents is
similar constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Farsighted agents may form
e¢ cient networks, while myopic agents cannot sustain those networks at equilibrium
since from an e¢ cient network, the agents have myopic incentives to cut a link with
a peripheral agent as long as u(n)  u(n  1) < c. Farsighted agents are not willing
to cut those links as they fear that the others will in turn modify sequentially their
choice of insurance partners so that the network that will form in the end will be
the same line connecting all the agents.
5 Application: the quadratic utility function
In this section, we analyze more in detail the formation of risk-sharing networks
when agents have a quadratic utility function. We illustrate through this example
the implications of the theorems presented in the previous sections about the for-
mation of risk-sharing networks by farsighted and myopic agents. In particular, we
investigate three questions. First, we analyze what is the impact of the risk-aversion
of the agents, of their initial wealth, and of the variance of the income shock on the
formation of risk-sharing networks. Second, we study to which extent the range of
costs for which farsightedly stable networks can be identied shrinks as the size of
the population increases. Third, we investigate whether additional results can be
obtained when the characterization we have established is incomplete, that is when
the cost of link formation is very small, small or intermediate.
Let v be a quadratic utility function v(y) = y   y2 where  represents the
level of risk-aversion of an individual. As shown in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a),
the expected utility function is then u(s) = v(y)   (2)=s where y and 2 are
respectively the mean and the variance of the income distribution. This expected
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utility function is increasing at a nondecreasing rate, and the total utility of the
members of a component (su(s)) is increasing at a constant rate, so that quadratic
utility functions verify our assumptions.
The stability of sets of networks is determined by comparing the expected utility
of an agent when she belongs to components of di¤erent sizes. For quadratic utility
functions, the variation of expected utility of an agent if she moves from a component
of size k to a component of size l is u(l) u(k) = 2(l k)=lk. As far as stability is
concerned, the mean of income (y) thus does not matter. The relevant parameters
of the utility functions are the variance of the shock (2) and the parameter that
represents the risk aversion (). In addition, only their product matters so that
uncertainty and risk aversion play the same role.
We have depicted in Figure 1 the evolution of the thresholds of link cost that are
relevant for the theorems as a function of the number of agents.10 The uncertainty
(2) and the risk aversion () change the scale of Figure 1 but not its shape since
a modication of one of those parameters a¤ects the various thresholds in the same
way. We assume in Figure 1 and in the rest of this section that 2 = 9. When the
number of agents increases, the range of costs for which Propositions 3.3, 3.4 and
3.5 applies shrinks while the range of intermediate costs (i.e. for which we have not
characterized the pairwise farsightedly stable sets) increases. For high costs of link
formation (u(n) u(2) < c < u(2) u(1) when n is even andmaxfu(n) u(2); (u(3) 
u(1))=2g < c < u(2)   u(1) when n is odd), the lower bound of the interval is
nondecreasing with n while the upper bound is xed. For very small costs of link
formation (0 < c  u(n)  u(n  1)), the upper bound of the interval is decreasing
with n since by assumption, the bigger is the set of agents with whom an agent shares
her risk, the smaller is her benet to have a new insurance partner. When n is even,
the range of costs for which Proposition 4 applies (u(n)   u(n   1) < c < u(n)  
u(int(n + 1)=2)) decreases with n as long as n  4. Similarly, this range decreases
with n when n is odd for n  5. The range of intermediate costs is determined by
the condition u(n)  u(n=2)  c  u(n)  u(2) when n is even and by the condition
u(n)  u(int((n+1)=2))  c  maxfu(n)  u(2); (u(3)  u(1))=2g when n is odd. It
is increasing with n since the lower bound of the interval (u(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)))
is decreasing in n while the upper bound is nondecreasing in n.
10We have not represented the threshold (u(n)   u(1))=2 since minf(u(n)   u(1))=2;u(n)  
u(int((n+ 1)=2))g = u(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)) when the utility function is quadratic.
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Figure 1. Cost thresholds and population size
The characterizations proposed in the theorems are not complete. The theorems
identify some equilibrium candidates but there may exist other equilibria. We have
developed an algorithm that aims at identifying all the pairwise farsightedly stable
sets to investigate whether additional results can be obtained when the character-
ization we have established is incomplete.11 Among n agents, there are possibly
K = 
n(n 1)=2
i=0 C
n(n 1)=2
i networks and 
K
i=1C
K
i equilibrium set candidates.
12 It is
thus increasingly complex to fully characterize the pairwise farsightedly stable sets
since the number of candidates explodes as n increases. When n = 3, there are
8 di¤erent networks that can form 256 di¤erent equilibrium set candidates and for
n = 4, there are 64 di¤erent possible networks and 1; 8447 E + 19 candidates.13
Having associated to each network a number between 1 and K, the output of the
algorithm is (i) a square matrix F of dimension KK, where K is the total number
of networks among n agents, such that F (i; j) = 1 if there is a farsighted improving
path from the network number i 2 f1; Kg leading to the network j 2 f1; Kg and (ii)
a matrix PFFS of dimension L K, where L is the total number of pairwise far-
sightedly stable sets such that a set composed of networks associated with non-zero
elements of a line is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
We have used the algorithm to determine the farsightedly stable sets of networks
formed among 3 agents. For more than 3 agents, we are not able to build a matrix
11The algorithm is available upon request from the author. We explain in Appendix 3.B the
main steps for its construction.
12Cnk gives the combination of n things taken k at a time without repetition and is equal to
n!=(k!(n  k)!).
13When n = 5, there are 1024 di¤erent networks and an innite number of candidates.
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whose number of lines corresponds to the number of candidates. We then have
considered subsets of the full set of equilibrium candidates.
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Figure 2. Risk-sharing networks among 3 agents.
In Figure 2, we depict the risk-sharing networks that could be formed among
three agents. We assume that 2 = 9 = v(y) so that the payo¤ of the agents is
normalized to 0 in the empty network. Proposition 1 completely characterizes the
pairwise myopically stable set of networks which coincides with the set of pairwise
stable networks. The simulations reveal that when c  1; 5 and c > 3 there are
no other pairwise farsightedly stable sets than those described in Theorems 3.4 and
3.5. When 1; 5 < c  3, a set composed of two networks connecting 2 agents is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set, and a set composed of one network connecting 2
agents and a star network, where the hub in the star is not connected in the linked
pair network is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.14 Farsighted agents
thus form e¢ cient networks while myopic agents do not. Table 1 summarizes these
results.
14The hub in a star is the agent who is directly connected to all the other agents.
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Cost Pairwise farsightedly stable set Pairwise myopically stable set
0 < c  1; 5 fg5g,fg6g,fg7g fg5; g6; g7g
1; 5 < c  3 fg2; g3g,fg2; g4g,fg3; g4g,fg2; g7g,fg3; g6g,fg4; g5g
fg2; g3; g4g
3 < c < 4; 5 fg2g,fg3g,fg4g fg2; g3; g4g
c = 4; 5 fg1; g2; g3; g4g fg1; g2; g3; g4g
c > 4; 5 fg1g fg1g
Table 1. Farsightedly and myopically stable sets when n=3 and 2=9.
In Figure 3, we have depicted all the networks that could be formed among 4
agents. Table 2 summarizes the results obtained with the simulations. To simplify
the presentation, we have not written down all the equilibrium candidates, but rather
all the classes of equilibrium candidates. The candidates that are symmetric to those
identied in Table 2 are also farsightedly stable. By Proposition 5, the only pairwise
farsightedly stable set is the set of all linked pairs networks when 2; 25 < c < 4; 5.
When c < 2; 25, each set composed of two lines of 4 agents is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set (Proposition 4). Also, when c  0; 75, each star network as a singleton is
a pairwise farsightedly stable set (Proposition 3). These propositions cover all the
costs but c = 2; 25, and as long as c < 2; 25, the characterization may be incomplete.
The simulations we have realized do not allow us to provide a complete identication
of the pairwise farsightedly stable sets. We have however considered all candidates
of at most six networks for all costs of link formation. We have also considered sets
of more than six networks, by focusing our attention on specic candidates.15
15For instance, we have considered sets of ten networks by eliminating the candidates involving
networks that are not minimally connected. By doing so, we have identied pairwise farsightedly
stable sets of more than six networks when 1; 5 < c  2; 25.
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Figure 3: Risk-sharing networks among four agents
When c = 2; 25, there are no farsighted improving paths from the networks
composed of a maximal number of linked pairs, implying that they belong to each
pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. The setG of all networks composed of a
maximal number of linked pairs and of the lines of 4 agents is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. Indeed, there is a farsighted improving path from each network other than
the lines of 4 agents or the circles16 of 4 agents leading to each network composed
16A circle is a network where each agent has two links.
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of a maximal number of linked pairs. The set G thus satises external stability.
The deviations from the networks composed of a maximal number of linked pairs
leading to a network outside the set necessarily involve the deletion of a link. These
deviations are deterred by the threat of coming back at the same network in one
step (see Lemma A.3). Deviations from lines of 4 agents involving the addition of
a link are deterred by application of Lemma A.3, while those involving the deletion
of a link are deterred by the threat of ending in a network composed of a maximal
number of linked pairs. Minimality is satised since any subset of G would violate
external stability. A set G composed of the three networks involving a maximal
number of linked pairs, two networks of one link such that each agent has a total of
one link in those two networks, and three lines of 3 agents (ga; gb; gc) such that each
agent has a total of three links in those three networks, is also a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. We have g 2 F (g0) for some g 2 fga; gb; gcg, for all g0 2 GL [ Gc, where
Gc is the set of circles of 4 agents. External stability is thus guaranteed since there
is a path from any other network not in the set leading to a network composed of a
maximal number of linked pairs. The addition of a link from a network in the set
leading to a network outside the set is never protable by application of Lemma A.3.
For the same reason, a deviation involving the deletion of one link from a component
of size 2 is deterred. Also, the hub of a line of 3 agents has no incentives to delete
one of her links because she may fear to end up without connections in a network of
one link. Minimality holds since external stability would be violated for any G0  G
such that less than three lines of 3 agents belong to G0 while deterrence of external
deviations would be violated for any G0  G such that less than two lines of 2 agents
belong to G0. The class of candidates we have just identied remains farsightedly
stable when 1; 5 < c < 2; 25. However, the set composed of all the lines of 4 agents
and all the networks composed of a maximal number of linked pairs is not since it
fails to satisfy minimality.17
For 0; 75 < c  1; 5, a set composed of two lines of 3 agents such that the
isolated agent is not the same agent in the two lines and the set of peripheral
agents is di¤erent in the two networks is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. This
candidate trivially satises external stability and minimality, and external deviations
are deterred by application of Lemma A.3. If the two lines of 3 agents shared the
17Any set composed of two lines of 4 agents is a pairwise farsightedly stable set by Proposition
4.
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same set of peripheral agents, external stability would be violated since there are no
farsighted improving paths from a line of 4 agents leading to a line of 3 agents such
that the peripheral agents are identical in those two networks. External stability
would also be violated if the isolated agent was the same agent in the two lines of
3 agents because there are no farsighted improving paths from a star leading to a
line of 3 agents such that the hub in the star is not connected in the line. It follows
that a set composed of three networks, two lines of 3 agents such that the isolated
agent is the same agent in those lines and a star where the hub in the star is not
connected in the lines, is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set. When c > 1; 5,
those candidates fail to satisfy external stability because there are no farsighted
improving paths from a network composed of components of size 2 or less leading to
a line of 3 agents. The simulations reveal that another class of candidates is pairwise
farsightedly stable when 0; 75 < c  1; 5. A set composed of one line of 4 agents and
another line of 3 agents such that the set of peripheral agents in the two lines is not
identical is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. External stability holds by application
of Lemma A.5, which establishes that there is a farsighted improving path from every
network leading to a line of 4 agents provided the payo¤ of the agents is di¤erent
in the initial and nal networks. The deletion of a link from a line of 4 agents is
deterred by the threat of coming back to the same network (see Lemma A.5) while
every other deviation is deterred by application of Lemma A.3. When c > 1; 5, such
candidates are no longer pairwise farsightedly stable because the hub in the line of
3 agents cannot be deterred from cutting one link. Indeed, the only stable outcome
she might reach by doing so is a line of four agents. When c < 0; 75, a set composed
of six networks that are not minimally connected, three networks where one agent
has three links while 2 other agents are connected and three networks where another
agent has three links while 2 other agents are connected, is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. To see that such candidates satisfy external stability, notice that from
a line of 4 agents, there is always an agent i with two links in the line who may
cut successively her two links, looking forward to the following succession of moves:
one agent deletes the remaining link, then the 3 agents other than agent i add a
link between them, starting rst with the links involving the agent j who has three
links in the nal network.18 Finally, agents i and j form a link. Deviations from a
18The two agents already connected to agent j add a link between them in this step. This move
is protable for them as long as c < 0; 75. When c  0; 75, there are no farsighted improving paths
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network in the set are deterred: an agent who cuts a link may always fear to come
back in the set with at least the same number of links, and a pair of agents who add
a link between them are worse o¤ by doing so, and could come back to the same
network in one step by cutting the link they have just added.
Cost Pairwise farsightedly stable sets Pairwise myopically stable sets
0 < c < 0; 75
fg27g; fg28g; fg29g; fg30g;
fg31; g32g,fg31; g33g,...,fg31; g42g;
fg46; g47; g48; g49; g50; g51g
fg27; g28; :::; g42g
c = 0; 75
fg27g; fg28g; fg29g; fg30g;
fg31; g32g,fg31; g33g,...,fg31; g42g
fg27; g28; :::; g42g
0; 75 < c  1; 5
fg11; g12g,fg11; g13g,fg11; g15g,
fg11; g16g,fg11; g17g,fg11; g19g,
fg11; g20g,fg11; g22g;
fg11; g33g,fg11; g34g,...,fg11; g42g;
fg31; g32g,fg31; g33g,...,fg31; g42g;
fg11; g18; g28g,fg11; g21; g28g
fg11; g12; :::; g22g
1; 5 < c < 2; 25
fg31; g32g,fg31; g33g,...,fg31; g42g;
fg2; g7; g8; g9; g10; g12; g14; g18g
fg2; g3; :::; g22; g31; g32; :::; g42g
c = 2; 25
fg8; g9; g10; g31; g32; :::; g42g;
fg2; g7; g8; g9; g10; g12; g14; g18g
fg8; g9; g10g
2; 25 < c < 4; 5 fg8; g9; g10g fg8; g9; g10g
Table 2. Farsightedly and myopically stable sets when n=4 and 2=9.
It is not easy to determine whether farsightedness helps reducing a conict be-
tween myopic stability and e¢ ciency, mainly because it implies a comparison of
the e¢ ciency of sets of networks. In addition, the pairwise myopically stable set
is unique by denition while pairwise farsightedly stable sets are not. In what
follows, we summarize the new insights obtained with the simulations when four
agents form a risk-sharing network. To compare the same object when discussing
the issue of stability versus e¢ ciency, we contrast the set of networks that belong
to some pairwise farsightedly stable set with the pairwise myopically stable set. (i)
from a network composed of minimally connected components leading to a network composed of
components that are not minimally connected.
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For very small costs of link formation (c  0; 75), myopic agents always form ef-
cient networks. Each e¢ cient network also belongs to some pairwise farsightedly
stable but it is not excluded that an equilibrium candidate is composed of networks
that are not minimally connected when agents are farsighted, because farsighted
agents can move from an e¢ cient network looking forward to an ine¢ cient network
where her situation has improved. (ii) When the costs of link formation are small
(0; 75 < c < 2; 25), we should further distinguish two cost thresholds. (ii.1) When
c  1; 5, the pairwise myopically stable set consists of all lines of three agents, which
are pairwise stable. The set of networks included in some farsightedly stable sets
are all the lines of three and four agents, and the star networks. This set is thus the
union of the pairwise myopically stable set and the set of e¢ cient networks. (ii.2)
When c > 1; 5, the set of networks included in some pairwise farsightedly stable set
and those included in the pairwise myopically stable set consist in all the networks
composed of one link, two links, and the lines of four agents. (iii) For intermedi-
ate costs of link formation (c = 2; 25), the pairwise stable networks are composed
of a maximal number of linked pairs. Those network also belong to some pairwise
farsightedly stable set in addition to the networks composed of lines involving two,
three, and four agents (iv) for high costs of link formation (c > 2; 25), Proposition
5 characterizes completely the farsightedly stable set of networks. It is the set of all
the networks composed of a maximal number of linked pairs, and coincides with the
pairwise myopically stable set.
In some cases, the set of networks belonging to some pairwise farsightedly stable
set coincides with the pairwise myopically stable set. In others, the two sets are
di¤erent. When the two sets are di¤erent, the pairwise myopically stable set is
included in the set of networks belonging to some pairwise farsightedly stable set,
and each pair of networks in the pairwise myopically stable set generates the same
value. The networks that are farsightedly stable but not myopically stable do not
necessarily generate more value than the networks that are pairwise stable. This
is indeed the case when the costs of link formation are very small or intermediate.
When the costs are small on the other hand, each network that is farsightedly stable
but not myopically stable is e¢ cient.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the formation of risk-sharing networks. A growing
empirical literature (see Fafchamps, 1992; Grimmard, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund,
2003; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006) has shown that a fully e¢ cient risk-pooling equi-
librium is not reached: risk-sharing does not take place within exogenous group such
as the village, but rather within networks involving agents having common charac-
teristics (neighborhood, professional or religious a¢ liation, kinship, etc). Most of
the theoretical papers on informal risk-sharing in developing countries assume that
no binding agreement can be enforced (see Kimball (1988); Coate and Revallion
(1993); Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002); Genicot and Ray
(2003); Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2005). These papers model the risk-sharing process
as a dynamic game where agents have incentives to transfer money today because
they expect to be reciprocated at a future date. The self-enforcing transfer schemes
identied involve incomplete income pooling, providing a theoretical argument to
explain the observed pattern of informal insurance relationships.
Platteau (2000) has argued that kinship groups, membership of a clan or of
a religious group are factors that help to imposing norms on members, enhancing
trust and that increase the ability to punish deviant behaviors, thereby making risk-
sharing easier. Thus, the lack of formal institutions allowing agents to commit to
future transfers may be relevant at the village level, but not within the aforemen-
tioned communities.
Bramoullé and Kranton (2007a) have developed a model of insurance network
formation, where agents invest in costly bilateral relationships in order to become
members of a group of agents insuring each other against income or expenditure
shocks. Their model is a decentralized model of coalition formation, where a coali-
tion is a set of agents that are directly or indirectly connected to each other. Each
member of a coalition commits to share her income with her insurance partners.
They have shown that the e¢ cient network is such that each agent is indirectly con-
nected to each other, leading to the maximal level of insurance in the population,
while strategic agents form networks involving income pooling in smaller groups,
because the gain for an agent from adding new insurance partners to the group is
decreasing with the size of the group while its cost is constant. They have thus
provided another theoretical explanation of the observation that full income pooling
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is not achieved in rural areas of developing countries, but they fail to explain why
risk-sharing occurs within networks involving agents having common characteristics.
This paper analyzes which pattern of insurance relationships emerges in the long
run when agents are farsighted, rather than myopic, in the sense that they are able
to forecast how other agents would react to their choice of partners. In his survey
of models of network formation, Jackson (2005) provides support to this behavioral
assumption by mentioning that farsightedness is important when agents have good
information about each other, which we suspect is the case in the aforementioned
communities.
We nd that for small costs of establishing and maintaining a partnership, far-
sighted agents may form e¢ cient networks that involve full income pooling while
myopic agents form networks connecting fewer individuals. Two mechanisms ex-
plain this result: (i) Farsighted agents belonging to small groups may decide to
create new partnerships that are not directly protable to them, because they real-
ize that other partners will further join this bigger and more attractive group. In
other words, the farsightedness of the agents may solve a coordination problem. (ii)
Farsighted agents may refrain from deleting costly links if they belong to a big group,
as they understand that this may induce others to rearrange their partnerships in
a way that deters the myopic incentives to delete the link at rst. Farsightedness
may thus reconcile the theory with the data observed in small communities. This
conclusion does not hold for all cost values. In particular, for very small cost of
link formation, myopic agents form e¢ cient networks only while farsighted agents
may form ine¢ cient networks. These ine¢ cient networks nonetheless involve full
risk-sharing, but not at the minimal cost.
To our knowledge, no existing work has attempted to establish whether agents are
farsighted or not when creating their network in rural areas of developing countries.
This paper o¤ers a characterization of farsightedly and myopically stable networks
that could be used in future work to estimate the degree of farsightedness of agents
by comparing the observed networks with the predicted ones under the two di¤erent
behavioral assumptions.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
The following lemma is useful in establishing Proposition 1.
Lemma A.1. (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007a) For all g0 2 G n G, we have
g 2M(g0) for some g 2 G.
Proof. Take a network g0 2 G nG. Start with g0 and let agents successively delete
unnecessary links (links connecting agents who are indirectly connected) until a
minimally connected network g00 is reached. Then, let some pair of agents belonging
to di¤erent components of size smaller than s add a link between them. Repeating
this operation leads to a network g000 in which less than two components have a size
smaller than s. From g000, take successively a component of size strictly bigger than
s and let an agent from this component delete a link with an agent who has exactly
one link in that component. When all these links are deleted, we end up at network
g0000 such that if (S; h) 2 C(g0000), then either (i) #S = 1 or (ii) #S = s, or (iii)
1 < #S < s and no other component (S 0; h0) 2 C(g0000) satises 1 < #S 0 < s. From
g0000, build a sequence of networks where at each step k, a link is added between a
singleton and an agent belonging to the biggest component of size strictly smaller
than s in the network of that step gk. When all these links have been added, we
end up in a network g 2 G. Each move in the sequence of networks going from g0
to g is protable, establishing the result. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let G be the pairwise myopically stable set. Suppose that s = s or s > s
and n  s+s, so thatG consists only of pairwise stable networks. By Lemma A.1,
there is a myopic improving path from every network outside G to some pairwise
stable network in G. However, the converse does not hold since each network in G
is by itself a closed cycle. This establishes that there are no other closed cycle than
the pairwise stable networks, that is G = G. If on the other hand s > s and
n > s + s, then no pairwise stable network exists. By Lemma A.1, we have that
G \ G 6= ?. Let g 2 G \ G. Starting from the network g, we can reach any
network g 2 G by adding links between members of di¤erent components of size s
and s0 where s; s0 2 fs+1; sg, by letting agents delete links with peripheral agents
from components connecting more than s agents, and by adding links between a
singleton and a member of a component connecting less than s agents. Since each
of the suggested move is protable for the agents involved, we have g 2 M(g) for
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all g 2 G. We then conclude that G  G. 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma A.2. Let a network g be such that (S; h) 2 C(g), #S > s=2 and i 2 S. If
Ui(g + ij) > Ui(g), then Uj(g + ij) < Uj(g) for all j 2 N .
Proof. Let g 2 G be such that (S; h),(S 0; h0) 2 C(g) and #S > s=2. Take agent
i 2 S and agent j 2 S 0. (i) If #S = #S 0 > s=2, then we have that Ui(g+ ij) < Ui(g)
and Uj(g + ij) < Uj(g) by denition of s. (ii) If #S 0 > #S > s=2, then at least
agent j 2 S 0 is not willing to add the link ij. Indeed, by denition of s, she would
not be willing to add a link with an agent of another component of size #S 0. She
is thus not willing to add a link with agent i who belongs to a component of size
smaller than #S 0. (iii) Similarly, if #S > #S 0, then at least agent i 2 S is not
willing to add the link ij.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let G be the pairwise myopically stable set.
(i) By contradiction, suppose that a network g0 2 G is such that g0 =2 Gm. Take
a network g composed of minimally connected components obtained from g0
by deleting unnecessary links. Formally, g is such that g 2 Gm, and for all
(S 0; h0) 2 C(g0), we have (S 0; h) 2 C(g) for some h  h0. Starting from g0 and
letting agents delete successively a link that belong to g0 but not to g, we nd
that g 2 M(g0). Thus the network g belongs to the same closed cycle C as
the network g0. However, g0 =2M(g), contradicting the fact that C is a closed
cycle. Thus g0 =2 G.
(ii) By contradiction, suppose that g0 2 G and (S; h) 2 C(g0) with #S > s. Since
#S > s  s, there is an agent i 2 S willing to cut a link ij where dj(g0) = 1
(such link exists since g0 2 Gm by part (i)). Thus, g0   ij 2 M(g0), implying
that g0 and g0   ij are in the same closed cycle C. However g0 =2 M(g0   ij)
since every path going from g0   ij to g0 implies, at some step, that an agent
belonging to a component of size bigger than s=2 should add a link. By Lemma
A.2, this move is not protable. This in turn contradicts the fact that C is a
closed cycle. It follows that g0 =2 G:
(iii.a) By contradiction, suppose that g0 2 G such that d(g0) = s   1  t  0, where
t 2 N+0 . Notice that each network whose total number of links is strictly
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smaller than s   1 is composed of components of size strictly smaller than
s. By denition of s, it follows that every pair of agents can protably add
a link from the network g0, i.e. g0 + ij 2 M(g0) 8ij =2 g0. Thus g0 and g0 + ij
are in the same closed cycle C. However g0 =2 M(g0 + ij) since every path
going from g0 + ij to g0 involves, at some step, the deletion of a link kl from a
network g00 such that d(g00) = d(g0) + 1. Since the network g00 is composed of
components of size smaller than or equal to s, the deletion of the link kl is
neither protable for agent k, nor for agent l. This contradicts the fact that
g0 and g0 + ij are in the same closed cycle. Thus g0 =2 G.
(iii.b) Take a network g 2 G. We show that d(g)  n   1   int((n   1)=s). By
part (i) of this proposition, we have that d(g) = n   #C(g). By part (ii)
of this proposition, there are no networks in G with fewer components than
a network composed of a maximal number of components of size s and of
one component with the remaining agents. Let g0 be such a network. We have
#C(g0) = 1+int((n 1)=s), implying that d(g)  d(g0) = n 1 int((n 1)=s).

The following lemma provides su¢ cient conditions to have a farsighted improving
path from one network to an adjacent one. It implies that the addition of a link
from a network such that at least one deviating agent is strictly worse o¤ in the
resulting network, or the deletion of a link from a network such that one of the two
agents involved in the link is strictly worse o¤ in the resulting network while the
other agent is not strictly better o¤, are deviations that are deterred.
Lemma A.3. Let g 2 G. If Ui(g+ ij) < Ui(g), then g 2 F (g+ ij). If Ui(g  ij) <
Ui(g) and Uj(g   ij)  Uj(g), then g 2 F (g   ij).
Proof. Trivial.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let 0 < c  u(n)  u(n  1). Notice that for such costs, two agents i; j who are
not indirectly connected at a network g are both better o¤ at the network g + ij
than at the network g.
(a) Each farsighted improving path emanating from a connected line g 2 GL
reaches a connected network, since g Pareto dominates g0 for each g0 2 Gm n
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GM . Thus, a set of networks G0 that does not contain a connected network
does not satisfy condition (ii) of Denition 2.
(b) Take a network eg 2 GM and let G = fg 2 G j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 Ng. In
order to prove that G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, we will show that
(b.i) eg 2 F (g0) for every g0 2 G n G and (b.ii) F (g) \ G = ; for every g 2 G
and hence, Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies.
(b.i) Take g0 2 G n G. (b.i.1) If for all g 2 G, we have g * g0, then start from g0
and build a sequence of networks where at each step, an agent who has more
links than at the network eg cuts a link. When all these links have been deleted,
we end up at the network g00 such that di(g00)  di(eg) for all i 2 N . Notice
that there are at most n   1 links in g00 and that Ui(g00) < Ui(eg) for some
i 2 N , since eg is e¢ cient and g00 =2 G. Agent i cuts one link in g00 leading to
the network g000, which is composed of multiple components. In g000 and in the
successive networks, an agent who has l links in a component of size s cuts a
link, looking forward to the formation of the network eg, if she has l + x links
or less in eg and n  s+x. The network reached through this path is g;. Once
in g;, agents successively add links to form eg. Notice that u(n) u(n  1)  c
implies u(s)  lc  u(s+ x)  (l+ x)c, if s+ x  n, since the expected utility
function is increasing at a decreasing rate. Each agent i cutting a link in a
network g in the path where she has l links in a component of size s is willing
to do so since her payo¤ in eg is Ui(eg)  u(n)  (l+x)c > Ui(g) Agents adding
links from g; to eg, looking forward to the formation of eg, are better o¤ in the
end network. (b.i.2) If g  g0 for some g 2 G, then di(g0)  di(eg) for all i 2 N ,
and dj(g0) > dj(eg) for some j 2 N . From g0, let a pair of agents add a link
such that at least one of the two agents adding the link has strictly more links
at the current network than at eg. By repeating this step, agents reach the
complete network gN . Once there, they successively delete the links that are
not in eg. Each move of the path is protable for the deviating agents who are
looking forward to the formation of eg. We thus conclude that eg 2 F (g0) for
every g0 2 G nG.
(b.ii) For every g 2 G, F (g) \G = ; since Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all g 2 G.
(c) Let G = fg1; g2g, where g1; g2 2 GM such that Ui(g1) 6= Ui(g2) for some agent
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i 2 N , and g1 and g2 are not star networks. In order to prove that G is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set, we will show that it satises conditions (i),
(ii) and (iii) of Denition 2.
(c.i) Every deviation from a network in the set is deterred by application of Lemma
A.3.
(c.ii) We have shown in part (b.i) that g1 2 F (g0) for every g0 2 G n G1, where
G1 = fg 2 G j Ui(g) = Ui(g1) for all i 2 Ng. By part (b.i), we have that
g2 2 F (g0) for every g0 2 G n G2, where G2 = fg 2 G j Ui(g) = Ui(g2) for all
i 2 Ng. Since G1 \G2 = ;, we have F (g0) \G 6= ; for all g0 =2 G.
(c.iii) Suppose that some subsetG0  G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Without
loss of generality, suppose that G0 = fg1g. Then, G0 does not satisfy the
condition (ii) of Denition 2 since g1 =2 F (g0) for g0 2 G1nfg1g, a contradiction.

The following two lemmas are central to the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma A.4. GL  F (g;) if c < min fu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)); (u(n)  u(1))=2g.
Proof. For such costs, two agents i and j in di¤erent components of size int((n+
1)=2) and int(n=2) at a network g0 both prefer the network g0+ ij to the network g0.
Take a network g 2 GL. Let g0 = g   ij where ij 2 g, i 2 Ce(g) and j 2 Ce(g) if n
is even such that the network g0 is composed of one component of size int((n+1)=2)
and of another of size int(n=2). The following path is a farsighted improving path
from g; to g. From g;, add successively each link kl 2 g0 until the network g0 is
formed. Agents i and j then add the link ij. Let g00 be a network of the path
going from g; to g in which agent k 2 N adds a link. If dk(g00) = 0, then since
c < (u(n)  u(1))=2, agent k prefers to add a link, looking forward to the formation
of the network g. If dk(g00) = 1, it is protable for agent k to add a link looking
forward to the network g since she belongs to a component of size s  int((n+1)=2)
in g00, implying that Uk(g00) = u(s)  c  u(int((n+1)=2))  c < u(n)  2c = Uk(g).
Since g was chosen arbitrarily, we have that g 2 F (g;) for all g 2 GL. 
Lemma 3.A.5. For G = fg 2 GL j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all i 2 N for some eg 2 GLg,
we have thatG  F (g0) for all g0 =2 G if c < min fu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)); (u(n)  u(1))=2g.
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Proof. Take a network eg 2 GL and let G = fg 2 GL j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all
i 2 Ng. Suppose that c < min fu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)); (u(n)  u(1))=2g. Take
g0 2 G n G. (i.1) Suppose that di(g0)  di(eg) for all i 2 N . Since g0 =2 G, we have
that dj(g0) > dj(eg) for some j 2 N . From g0, let agent j successively add a link with
the agents she is not directly connected to. Then, each pair of agents who are not
directly connected adds a link between them to form the complete network. From
the complete network, the agents cut the links that do not belong to the network eg to
reach it. One can see that this sequence of actions describes a farsighted improving
path from the network g0 leading to the network eg. (i.2) Suppose that di(g0) < di(eg)
for some i 2 N . Then, start from g0 and build a sequence of networks where at each
step, an agent who has more links than at the end network eg cuts a link. When all
these links have been deleted, we end up at the network g00 such that di(g00)  di(eg)
for all i 2 N and dj(g00) < dj(eg) for some j 2 N . It follows that the network g00 is
composed of multiple components. In g00 and in the successive networks, the agents
having 2 links cut one link. They are willing to do so since they are looking forward
to eg where they belong to a bigger component and pay at worse the same cost. When
all these links have been deleted, we are in a network composed of components of
size 2 and of singletons. Agents having a link successively cut this link to reach g;
looking forward to eg. From g;, there is a farsighted improving path leading to eg
(Lemma A.4). We conclude that eg 2 F (g0). This does not depend on the choice of
the network eg 2 G, thus G  F (g0). 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose that c < min fu(n)  u(int((n+ 1)=2)); (u(n)  u(1))=2g.
(a) Take a network eg 2 GL and let G(eg) = fg 2 GL j Ui(g) = Ui(eg) for all
i 2 Ng. From Lemma A.5, we have that G(eg)  F (g0) for every g0 2 GnG(eg).
In addition, F (g) \ G(eg) = ; for every g 2 G(eg), since Ui(g) = Ui(g0) for
all g; g0 2 G(eg). Hence, Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2009) applies.
(b) Take the set fg1; g2g where g1; g2 2 GL and Ui(g1) 6= Ui(g2) for some i 2 N . To
show that fg1; g2g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, we show that it satises
the three conditions of denition 2. (ii.1) Deterrence of external deviations is
satised since the network g0 reached by adding or deleting a link from g1 (or g2)
is not a minimally connected line. Thus, from Lemma A.5, g1 2 F (g0) which
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deters the incentives to deviate from g1. (ii.2) External stability is ensured by
Lemma A.5 since g1 2 F (g0) for the networks g0 such that Ui(g0) 6= Ui(g1) for
some agent i, and g2 2 F (g0) for the networks g0 such that Ui(g0) = Ui(g1) for
all i 2 N . (i.3) Minimality is ensured since external stability would be violated
if the set was smaller. 
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma A.6. If n is odd, then for all g0 2 GnGk, whereGk = fg 2 G j di(g) = 1 for
all i 2 N n fkg, dk(g) = 0g, we have that Gk  F (g0) if maxf(u(3) u(1))=2; u(n) 
u(2)g < c < u(2)  u(1).
Proof. Let n be odd and let maxf(u(3)  u(1))=2; u(n)  u(2)g < c < u(2)  u(1).
Take k 2 N and let Gk = fg 2 G j di(g) = 1 for all i 2 N n fkg, dk(g) = 0g. Take
g 2 Gk and g0 2 G n Gk. Notice that an agent prefers a network in which she has
one link to any network in which she has two or more links when u(n)   u(2) <
c < u(2)  u(1).
(i) If di(g0)  1 8i 2 N , then start with g0 and build a sequence of networks where
at each step, either a singleton adds a link that belongs to the network g, or
an agent who has two links deletes a link that does not belong to the network
g until the network g is reached. Step 1a: A singleton in g0 other than agent k
adds a link that belongs to the network g. Since at least one agent, say i, has
no link at g0 then Ui(g0) = u(1) < Ui(g) = u(2)   c, thus agent i is willing to
add the link looking forward to g. The other agent, say j, has either no link
at g0 or she has one link in a component of size 2. In both cases, she agrees
to add the link ij looking forward to g. Step 1b: In the remaining network,
if an agent has two links, she deletes a link that does not belong to g. This
agent is willing to delete a link looking forward to g where she has one link.
Step l: Proceed inductively in l, if an agent other than agent k is a singleton,
she adds a link that belongs to g; then, on the remaining network, if an agent
has two links, she deletes a link that does not belong to g. Step L: When all
these links are added or removed, we end up at the network g. We conclude
that g 2 F (g0). Since the choice of g 2 Gk does not matter, we conclude that
Gk  F (g0).
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(ii) If di(g0) > 1 for some agent i 2 N , then start with g0 and build a sequence
of networks where at each step, some agent other than agent k who has more
than one link deletes a link. When all these links have been deleted, if agent
k has more than one link, she successively deletes all her links but one so
that the network g000 is reached with di(g000)  1 8i 2 N . From g000, there is a
farsighted improving path going to g (see part (i) of the proof of this lemma).
Step 1a: An agent, say i, who has more than one link deletes a link ii0 such
that i0 6= k and agent i0 has exactly one link at the current network. Repeat
this step until a network is reached in which the agents having more than one
link are connected to agents having also more than one link or to agent k.
Step 1b: In the remaining network, let an agent, say j, who has more than
one link, delete a link di¤erent than the link jk. An agent deleting a link in
one of those steps is willing to do so as she has at least 2 links at the network
where she deletes a link and she is looking forward to g in which she has one
link. Step l: Proceed inductively in l, each time an agent, say i, with two
links or more is connected to an agent other than agent k that has exactly
one link, agent i deletes that link. Then, on the remaining network, an agent
who has two links or more, say agent j, deletes a link other than the link jk.
Step L: When all these links have been deleted, a network g00 is reached such
that di(g00)  1, 8i 2 N n fkg. Step L+ 1: If agent k has 2 links or more, she
successively deletes all her links but one. Agent k has s links in a component
of size s+1 for some s  2 at a network, say g1, where she deletes a link. She
is willing to delete a link in g1 looking forward to g since, for s  2, we have
that Uk(g1) = u(s+1) sc  u(3) 2c < Uk(g) = u(1) when u(3) u(1) < 2c.
Step L + 2: We are in a network g000 such that di(g000)  1 for all i 2 N and
g000 =2 Gk by construction. In part (i) of this proposition we have shown that
Gk 2 F (g000). We conclude that Gk 2 F (g0). 
Proof of Proposition 5.
Let u(n)  u(2) < c < u(2)  u(1).
(a) Suppose that n is even. Let G = fg 2 G j di(g) = 1 for all i 2 Ng. In
order to prove that G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, we will
show that (a.i) for every g0 2 G n G, we have that F (g0) \ G 6= ; and (a.ii)
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for every g 2 G, F (g) = ; and hence, Theorem 5 in Herings, Mauleon and
Vannetelbosch (2009) applies.
(a.i) Take g0 2 GnG. Start with g0 and build a sequence of networks where at each
step, either an agent with more than one link deletes a link, or two unconnected
agents add a link between them. This path leads to the formation of a network
g00 2 G and each deviating agent is better o¤ in g00 than in the networks in
which she adds/cuts a link. Thus F (g0) \G 6= ;.
(a.ii) By contradiction, suppose that F (g) 6= ;, say g0 2 F (g), for some network
g 2 G. Then, at least an agent, say i, is willing to create or delete a link
from g looking forward to g0, that is, Ui(g) < Ui(g0). Having Ui(g) < Ui(g0)
implies that agent i has exactly one link in g0 and belongs to a component of
size strictly bigger than 2. Then, at least an agent, say j, has 2 links or more
in g0. However, every path going from g to g0 is such that the payo¤ of agent
j is smaller in g0 than in the network in which she adds a second link. This
contradicts the fact that g0 2 F (g). Thus F (g) = ;.
(b) Suppose that n is odd and that (u(3)   u(1))=2 < c. We have that (b.i) for
every g0 2 G n Gk, F (g0) \ Gk 6= ; (see Lemma A.6), and (b.ii) for every
g 2 Gk, F (g) \ Gk = ;, since Ui(g) = Ui(g0) for all i 2 N , for all g; g0 2 G.
Hence, Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies, Gk
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(c) Suppose that n is odd, n  5 and (u(3) u(1))=2 < c. Take gk 2 Gk and gl 2 Gl
such that k 6= l. In order to prove that G = fgk; glg is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set, we show that G satises the three conditions of Denition 2.
(c.i) Every deviation from a network in the set is deterred by application of Lemma
A.3.
(c.ii) We have shown in Lemma A.6 that gk 2 F (g0) for every g0 2 G n Gk and
gl 2 F (g0) for every g0 2 GnGl. Since Gl\Gk = ;, we thus have F (g0)\G 6= ;
for all g0 =2 G.
(c.iii) Suppose by contradiction that some subset G0  G is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. Without loss of generality, suppose that G0 = fgkg. We then
have that condition (ii) of Denition 2 is not satised since gk =2 F (g0) for
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g0 2 Gk n fgkg, and Gk n fgkg 6= f;g when n  5, contradicting the fact
that G0 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Thus, G satises the minimality
condition. 
Appendix 3.B. Description of the algorithm
Having associated to each network a number between 1 and K, the output of
the algorithm is (i) a square matrix F of dimension K  K, where K is the total
number of networks among n agents, such that F (i; j) = 1 if there is a farsighted
improving path from network number i 2 f1; Kg leading to network j 2 f1; Kg and
(ii) a matrix PFFS of dimension L K, where L is the total number of pairwise
farsightedly stable sets of networks such that a set composed of networks associated
with non-zero elements of a line is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
To determine whether there is some farsighted improving path from some initial
network a 2 f1; Kg to some nal one b 2 f1; Kg, the algorithm proceeds by steps.
Step 1: The algorithm creates at the rst step a vector Gab(1) containing all the
possible networks that are adjacent to the initial network a such that either one link
is added and both agents are better o¤ in the nal network b compared to the initial
one, or one link is deleted and at least one agent involved in that link is better o¤
at the end network.
Step 2: At the second step, the algorithm creates a vector Gab(2) which consists
of the elements of Gab(1) and all the networks that are adjacent to a network c in
Gab(1) but not yet included in Gab(1) and such that either one link is added and
both agents are better o¤ in the nal network b compared to the current network c,
or one link is deleted and at least one agent involved in that link is better o¤ at the
end network.
Step p: At the pth step, the algorithm creates a vector Gab(p) which consists of
the elements of Gab(p   1) and all the networks that are adjacent to a network c
in Gab(p   1) but not yet included in Gab(p   1) and such that either one link is
added and both agents are better o¤ in the nal network b compared to the current
network c, or one link is deleted and at least one agent involved in that link is better
o¤ at the end network.
The algorithm stops at step P where P is the smallest integer such that either
b 2 Gab(P ), or Gab(P ) = Gab(P   1). The niteness of the number of networks
implies that the algorithm ends in a nite number of steps. There is a farsighted
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improving path from the initial network to the nal network if the nal network
b belongs to Gab(P ). By running this algorithm for each possible pair of initial
network and nal network, we obtain a square matrix F of dimension KK, where
K = 
n(n 1)=2
i=0 C
n(n 1)=2
i is the total number of networks among n agents, such that
F (a; b) = 1 if there is a farsighted improving path from the network a leading to the
network b, and F (a; b) = 0 otherwise.
In the second part of the algorithm, we build a matrix PFSS of dimension
LK, where L is the total number of pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
such that a set composed of networks associated with non-zero elements of a line
is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. To nd this matrix, we start from
a matrix H which contains all the possible equilibrium candidates -each line of the
matrix being associated with one candidate- and we successively delete the lines that
do not satisfy external stability, deterrence of external deviations, and minimality.
Step 1: First build a matrix H of size Ki=1C
K
i  K, such that each line of H
corresponds to a di¤erent equilibrium candidate. When n = 3, we have 8 di¤erent
networks that can form 256 di¤erent equilibrium set candidates. A number between
1 and 8 is attributed to each network. For candidates of less than 8 networks, we use
0 to ll in the matrix. For example, the rst line of H is composed of the number 1
in the rst cell and of zeros in the remaining ones, and corresponds to the candidate
where the empty network (who is associated with the number 1) as a singleton is a
candidate. For the sake of notation, let lM(k) be the set of the non-zero elements of
line k of the matrix M . We thus have lH(1) = f1g.
Step 2: Build the matrix H 0 obtained from H by deleting the lines that do not
satisfy the external stability requirement. To do so, look for each line k of the matrix
H whether F (a; b) = 1 for all a 2 f1; Kg n lH(k), for some b 2 lH(k).
Step 3: Build the matrix H 00 obtained from H 0 by deleting the lines that do not
satisfy deterrence of external deviations. To do so, look for each line k of the matrix
H 0 whether for all network a =2 lH0(k) obtained from a network b 2 lH0(k) by adding
a link ij, we have F (a; c) = 1 for some c 2 lH0(k) such that either Yi(c) < Yi(b),
or Yj(c) < Yj(b), or Yi(c) = Yi(b) and Yj(c) = Yj(b). Then repeat the operation for
deviations involving the deletion of a link.
Step 4: Build the matrix PFSS from H 00 by removing the lines that do not
satisfy the minimality requirement.
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